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3.4. Self-Rule. Autonomy. Fostering Diversity. 3.5. Democracy. The Value of Compromi-
se as an Alternative to ‘Winner-Takes-All’ Democracy. Conflict management. 3.6. Futu-
re Challenges to Swiss Federalism. – Abstract-Resum-Resumen.
1. Short historic overview of the development  
of Swiss Federalism
From 1291 to 1797
When the modern Swiss Federation1 was founded in 1848, the 
Article received 25/06/2009; appoved 16/07/2009.
1. The founding fathers of the new constitution which changed the confederation into 
a federation did not change the original label confederation for different reasons, in 
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cantons had developed their own national identities, and the lin-
guistic, religious, and economic diversity of modern Switzerland has 
its roots in these earlier states. The federal structure was the result 
of a compromise that was reached after a religiously-motivated civ-
il war (the Sonderbund War), where the Protestant cantons, influ-
enced mainly by French liberalism which favored a centralized lib-
eral state, opposed the conservative Catholic cantons advocating a 
confederal arrangement based on the original alliance of sovereign 
cantons. Originally, the cantons were sovereign states cooperating 
within a loose treaty of alliance called the “confederation”2 that 
emerged from an original 600-year-old treaty of alliance between 
three rural cantons which developed into a loose confederation with 
13 cantons, some associate members and some subordinated terri-
tories. 
1798 - 1848
From 1798 to 1813, the revolutionary forces of France later run 
by Napoleon did not occupy Switzerland but imposed a centralized 
state structure run by a directory modeled on the French directory of 
1795. This centralized state turned out to be unworkable, and there-
fore was somewhat federalized by Napoleon in 1803. 
The brief experience with centralism has contributed to the 
deeply ingrained belief that Switzerland can only exist as a federal, 
strongly decentralized state. Although the federation has been con-
tinuously strengthened and centralized since the creation of the loose 
federal state in 1848, the cantons still enjoy a substantial degree of 
legislative, organizational, and financial autonomy which is matched 
by few other federal states.  
particular for reasons of translation. In German, Switzerland is also known as Eidgenos-
senschaft. This word cannot be translated into French, Italian or Romansh. They also 
stuck to the word confederation because although the constitution radically changed 
the system of cantonal sovereignty, this word confederation still suggests strong can-
tonal sovereignty.
2. The official name of Switzerland, “Swiss Confederation”, points to the country’s his-
torical origin. As Switzerland is, from a legal point of view, a federal state and not a 
confederal arrangement, we will use the term “Federation” to refer to the country as a 
whole or to the federal level of government.
The Current Situation of Federalism in Switzerland
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1.1. Three federal constitutions
The Constitution of 1848
The first constitution of the Swiss Confederation was adopted 
in 1848 after the short civil war in 1847. This constitution only trans-
ferred to the federation the powers which were absolutely necessary 
for the survival of the new confederation. The federation had no army, 
no currency, and no mandate to unify civil or criminal law. The cantons 
that agreed to form this new federation remained sovereign with 
regard to almost all important powers. However, in order to avoid a 
new hostile alliance of cantons, the new constitution explicitly pro-
hibited any political alliance with external powers among the cantons 
within Switzerland. 
This new constitution, which for the first time created a new 
state out of the previously sovereign members of the alliance, was a 
compromise between the liberal cantons influenced by the central-
istic, democratic ideas of the French Revolution and the conservative 
cantons defending the ancient regime of the former cantonal aris-
tocracies. Although Swiss federalism has radically developed since 
these times, the fundamental concept of the governmental system 
with a directory as the executive branch of government and the leg-
islative branch with a second chamber (modeled on the American 
Senate) has never been changed, even though the constitution was 
substantially modified in 1874 and in 1999. The directory was adapt-
ed to Swiss needs from the Directory of Revolutionary France in 1795, 
with more directors to meet the interests of small cantons and Swiss 
diversity.
The Constitution of 1874
The first important development of federalism took place when 
the new constitution was adopted in 1874. This new constitution pro-
vided for many important cantonal powers to be transferred to the 
federal level. With the new constitution the confederation got its own 
army, its own coins (the monopoly of the federal government to issue 
banknotes was only introduced in 1891), an open free market, and 
the power to issue a common civil and criminal law. Procedural law 
remained cantonal, however. 
Thomas Fleiner
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Unlike the American Constitution, which is very difficult to 
change, the Swiss Constitution can be changed much more easily by 
a simple majority at national and/or cantonal level. Thus, since the 
Constitution of 1874 came into force, the federal constitution has 
been changed many times. Most of these changes – more than a hun-
dred in total – gave important new powers to the federal government. 
Thus, the entire dynamic of federalism in Switzerland is reflected by 
popular votes accepting or rejecting constitutional amendments. Some 
of those amendments were made following a popular initiative, but 
only 12 out of 118 were adopted by the majority of the people and 
the cantons. Most of the constitutional amendments passed have 
therefore been submitted to direct democratic vote by the parliament. 
However, even though popular initiatives have been rejected, they 
have nonetheless often had an important legislative or even consti-
tutional impact. 
Besides the centralizing constitutional amendment, some other 
important modifications have been made since 1874. Some of those 
constitutional modifications broadened the direct democratic rights 
of citizens. The constitution of 1874 had already introduced the right 
of the people to ask for a popular legislative referendum. In 1891 the 
constitution introduced the popular initiative with the right of citizens 
to submit a constitutional amendment to a direct democratic vote by 
popular initiative. Later the legislative referendum was complemented 
with the Referendum for International Treaties. In order to avoid the 
misuse of emergency powers by the Government, a new amendment 
proposed by popular initiative required that even emergency consti-
tutional and legislative amendments had to be submitted to a manda-
tory or facultative referendum of the people. The right of women to 
vote was unfortunately only adopted in 1970, although in certain, 
mainly French-speaking cantons it had been introduced earlier. 
The Constitution of 20003
Even in the 1960’s, some leading politicians had asked for a to-
tal revision of the constitution, which had been written in the 19th 
3. English version: http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/c101.html; unofficial Spanish version: http://
www.admin.ch/org/polit/00083/index.html?lang=en. 
The Current Situation of Federalism in Switzerland
55
REAF, núm. 9, octubre 2009, p. 51-90
century and amended many times since then. Their main idea was not 
to change the political system but to draft a modern constitution 
readable by the citizens of our time. In 1987 the parliament delegat-
ed the task of drafting a new constitution, which was to be submitted 
to debate in both chambers of the parliament, to the Federal Council. 
On the basis of this procedure, the majority of the people of the can-
tons adopted a new constitution in April 1999, which is the constitu-
tion currently in force since January 1st 2000.4 
As mentioned above, this new constitution did not make any 
major changes with regard to the governmental system. The most 
important changes in this new constitution, besides the modern word-
ing, are those issues relating to federalism. In principle, the central 
powers of the federal government have been extended. In order to 
compensate the cantons for the loss of their powers, the rights of 
cantonal governments to participate within the federal decision-mak-
ing process were increased. In general, one can argue that the new 
constitution did respect the balance of self-rule and shared rule by 
diminishing self-rule and expanding shared rule. 
With regard to the financial powers of the federation, for a 
long time the constitution only provided the federal government 
with limited constitutional powers to levy indirect and direct taxes. 
The current tax powers of the federation will have to be renegoti-
ated before 2020 as the current constitution limits the power of the 
federation to finance its assignments by direct and indirect taxes up 
to this time.5
1.2. Developments in Federalism since 2000
Although some important issues in the old constitution such 
as the judiciary, direct democracy, and finances needed to be changed 
with the new constitution, the federal government did not want 
to overload the basic new document for a new constitution in order 
to avoid having many and different adversaries in the popular vote. 
Thus, it postponed important modifications for some separate, 
4. Fleiner, Misic and Töpperwien Kluwer, Swiss Constitutional Law, (The Hague, 2005).
5. See Swiss Constitution Art. 196 no.12, “Transitional Provisions” and  Art. 126 no. 13-14. 
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later votes. Those main modifications focused on the judiciary 
(passed in 2000), direct democracy (passed in 2003) and reform of 
the financial system (passed in 2004). Some reforms, in particular 
with regard to federal powers in education, were proposed only 
after the new constitution had been adopted. With regard to fed-
eralism, we will deal with the most important modifications regard-
ing the new financial order and with developments in the field of 
education. As the issue of the judiciary requires particular attention 
with regard to federalism, we will focus on the judiciary in a special 
section. 
The New Financial Order
This is the most important development with regard to federal-
ism since this new constitution was adopted by a constitutional ref-
erendum in 2004. It opted for a new financial order on one hand and 
on the other it decided to improve internal Swiss solidarity and provide 
for a fairer financial parity among the cantons. With regard to the 
new parity, even the peoples of some of the rich cantons agreed to 
support the poorer cantons with some of their income taxes. This new 
solidarity was an important symbol for the coherence of the cultural, 
linguistic, religious and historical diversity which still exists. Based on 
these new constitutional provisions, the federal government has to 
balance cantonal inequalities with regard to their financial perform-
ances (Art. 135).
With the new financial order, the constitution also explicitly in-
troduced the principle of subsidiary for the first time (Art. 5a). Paral-
lel to the introduction of the principle of subsidiary, the constitution 
also provides for some basic principles as guidelines for the division 
of federal and cantonal powers (Art. 43a)
In 1848 the federal government was mainly financed by its own 
institutions such as the federal post office and customs. Since 1874 
the federal government has never had unlimited power to levy taxes 
either on the income of the people or through a value added tax. The 
income of the confederation of Switzerland was always only possible 
with a constitutional amendment which is limited in time. The actual 
power of the confederation to levy direct and indirect taxes lasts un-
til the year 2020. 
The Current Situation of Federalism in Switzerland
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Education
The other most important development took place in the field 
of education. For a long time education has been considered the main 
domain of the cantons, who could only use their power to organize 
and develop education to preserve and develop their linguistic, reli-
gious, and historical identity at cantonal level. Only with regard to 
professional education did the federal government already have some 
implied powers from 1908 and expressly formulated powers from 
19476. The main focus of these competences was to guarantee equal 
opportunities with regard to professional education in order to have 
an open and equal market not to be disturbed by cantonal border 
lines throughout Switzerland. 
With regard to university education, the cantons were always 
most reluctant to confer the power to establish a federal university 
on the federal government. Only in the field of technical university 
education had the cantons accepted a limited federal power.
With the new Article 61a of the federal constitution, the coun-
try decided in 2006 to transfer joint responsibility to provide for a 
high quality of education to the federation and to the cantons. Pri-
mary education remains principally a cantonal competence; profes-
sional education is to be regulated by the federal government and 
university education is under the joint responsibility of the federation 
and the cantons.
In order to manage these common responsibilities in the field of 
university education, a joint university council is established composed 
of the federation and the cantons. This council is responsible for the 
high quality of university education. Thus, Switzerland has for the first 
time set up a joint council of the federal and cantonal governments 
which has to make decisions to be implemented on the federal and 
on the cantonal level. The bill and proposal of the Federal Council for 
a new law taking into account the new joint powers of the federation 
and the cantons was submitted to the parliament in May 2009. In ad-
dition, the cantons will conclude a treaty with the confederation in 
order to assure their own legal basis for cooperation.
6. Art. 43 ter g of the old constitution.
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1.3. The Judiciary
The Civil Law System
With regard to the Judiciary, Switzerland has followed the concept 
of federalism within the civil law system. Accordingly, unlike in the US 
and in some other common law federal countries, there is no dualism 
between the federal and the state judiciary. There is in Switzerland 
only one judiciary which has the power to apply federal and cantonal 
law. Unlike in Belgium where the Judiciary is centralized (though di-
vided into a Flemish and a Walloon section), the main pillar of the 
Swiss judiciary are the cantonal courts organized by the cantons. The 
cantonal courts have the power to interpret and to apply federal law 
as well as the respective cantonal law. The Federal Supreme Court has 
mainly an appellate function with regard to the cantonal courts.
This basic system has not changed since the creation of the Swiss 
Federation. However, the power of the federal judiciary has been 
strengthened throughout the historic development of Swiss federal-
ism. According to the Constitution of 1848, the Federal Supreme Court 
was composed of 11 judges working only part time. Today, mainly 
based on constitutional amendments for the improvement of the fed-
eral judiciary in 2000, the federal judiciary has been expanded by a 
new first instance criminal court competent to decide on criminal 
cases assigned to the federal judiciary by legislation, and a new first 
instance administrative court to decide on issues of federal adminis-
trative law with a right to appeal finally to the Federal Supreme 
Court.7 
Cantonal Courts
Civil law, criminal law, and even federal administrative law im-
plemented by cantonal legislation are first controlled by cantonal 
courts. The cantons have the constitutional power and responsibility 
to implement federal law8. With regard to criminal law, it is the can-
7. Federal Constitution 191a.
8. Constitution Art. 46.
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tonal prosecutor who has to prosecute persons suspected of having 
violated criminal law and to charge them before the cantonal judge 
for having breached criminal law. 
Criminal Law
However, criminal law and criminal procedure were mainly can-
tonal until 1942. Since 1942, cantonal criminal codes have been re-
placed by a new federal criminal law. For a long time cantonal courts 
decided on criminal procedures on the basis of cantonal statutes. With 
the constitutional amendment of 2000, the federation has been grant-
ed the power to issue legislation on criminal procedure9. This statute 
has been adopted by the parliament but it can only be enforced when 
the new authorities (e.g. for investigation) provided for in this new 
procedural law are in place. The proposal for this legislation on crim-
inal justice authorities is currently in parliament (June 2009).
Civil Law
A very similar situation has developed with regard to civil law 
including family law, commercial law, and property law. A common 
commercial code was already implemented at the end of the 19th 
century. A federal civil code has been in force since the beginning of 
the 20th century. However, according to criminal law, federal civil law 
has been applied by cantonal courts on the basis of cantonal codes 
on civil procedure. With the constitutional amendment of 2000, the 
power to legislate on civil procedure has also been granted to the 
federation. A federal code on civil procedure is currently in prepara-
tion and will soon come into force.
Organization of the Cantonal Judiciary
With regard to the organization of the courts and the election 
of judges, as well as  the implementation of the principle of an inde-
pendent judiciary, the cantons are still sovereign regarding the or-
9. Art. 123.
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ganization of their own judiciary responsible for applying cantonal 
law and federal law subject to appeal to the Federal Supreme Court. 
In this respect, there still remain important diversities between cantons 
with aristocratic, democratic-republican, or rural traditions. 
Public Law
With regard to public law (constitutional law and administrative 
law), in 1848 the constitution had already granted limited power to 
the Federal Court to ensure cantonal authorities complied with the 
federal constitution. Accordingly, after 1875 citizens could sue their 
canton before the court for having violated the federal constitution. 
This power was institutionalized with the constitution of 1874 and 
since its implementation in 1875 it has been constantly broadened 
and improved by the federal legislator and by the court decisions of 
the Federal Supreme Court. 
The Convention on Human Rights 
It must be mentioned in this context that Switzerland’s member-
ship of the Council of Europe and in particular its ratification of the 
Convention on Human Rights had an important impact with regard 
to the Swiss judiciary, especially with regard to access to justice as a 
fundamental right enshrined in Article 6 of the convention. Based on 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights as well as 
on the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme Court,,cantonal and 
federal administrative law as well as criminal procedures had to be 
radically improved. As Switzerland implements international treaties 
on the basis of monism, the Federal Supreme Court could use the 
new powers granted to it by the Convention on Human Rights Trea-
ty extensively, and declare this convention to be constitutional in 
level. 
This development has also influenced federalism. In particular, 
it has centralized supervision by the Federal Court of cantonal criminal 
procedure and administrative law with regard to their responsibility 
to establish new administrative courts or to enlarge their powers in 
order to guarantee individual citizens access to the court. The new 
Article 29a, also adopted in 2000, has in fact introduced a fundamen-
The Current Situation of Federalism in Switzerland
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tal right to access to court and to sue public authorities acting beyond 
or against legal powers. 
Lack of Constitutional Review of Federal Legislation
There is still one important deficit with regard to the power of 
the judiciary which also has a certain impact on federalism. The Fed-
eral Supreme Court currently has no power to review the constitu-
tionality of federal legislation. Moreover, in general it has no power 
to review acts of the federal parliament and of the federal council 
(executive)10. 
Unlike the Spanish Supreme Court, the Federal Supreme Court 
of Switzerland cannot review federal statutes which might violate 
constitutionally guaranteed cantonal powers. With regard to funda-
mental rights, at least the European Court of Human rights can, to a 
certain degree, rectify this deficit. Thus, federalism in Switzerland is 
still only a matter of political decision. There is no court supervision 
which could impede the federal legislator intervening in constitution-
ally guaranteed cantonal sovereignty. However, Swiss history has 
shown that the popular power to ask for a referendum with regard 
to federal legislation has had an important impact in preventing the 
Swiss legislator from violating cantonal powers guaranteed by the 
constitution. 
1.4. The Federal units: The Cantons
Bottom-up Federalism
Unlike Belgium, Canada, India and Australia, Switzerland is a 
federal state which was, like the US, a federation established from 
the bottom up. The sovereign cantons created the new federal state 
in 1848. With this new constitution, the cantons gave up their original 
sovereignty as independent states. Since the approval of the Constitu-
tion of 1848, the federation has been able to make decisions on its 
10. Art. 189 para.4.
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relationship with the cantons and their status by a constitutional ma-
jority. 
Although in theory the former alliance of the sovereign cantons 
was replaced by a somewhat modern federal constitution, one has to 
be aware that the making of the nation-state had first already taken 
place in many of the cantons shortly after the French July Revolution 
of 1830. However, it was mainly the liberal cantons which replaced 
the old aristocratic regime with a new parliament elected and legiti-
mized by the people and with an executive council composed of five, 
seven, or even nine magistrates, also elected by the people. 
As many of those modern liberal constitutions were a result of 
popular revolutionary movements within the cantons, they already 
provided direct democratic elements not only with regard to elections 
but also with regard to the adoption of constitutional amendments. 
Before the outbreak of the civil war in 1847, therefore, Switzerland 
was not only divided linguistically and religiously between the two 
Christian confessions – the Catholics and the Protestants – but also 
politically between the modern liberal and conservative cantons. Also, 
the Catholic cantons were, on the whole, less developed economi-
cally, and politically still devoted to the ancient, mostly aristocratic, 
governmental system.
Cantonal Sovereignty
Even with the new federal constitution, the cantons insisted on 
having their sovereignty explicitly respected by the new constitution 
(Art.3). This constitutional symbol of cantonal sovereignty has even 
endured to this day, with the new constitution of the year 2000 ex-
plicitly guaranteeing cantonal sovereignty. The other important prin-
ciple also enshrined in this same article reflects bottom-up federalism 
and guarantees cantonal powers constitutionally as they can only be 
transferred to the federation by a specific constitutional amendment. 
As in the US Constitution11, cantonal powers cannot simply be limited 
by legislation, but only by a constitutional amendment. The federa-
tion does not even have a necessary and proper clause enabling fed-
11. 10th amendment to the US Constitution.
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eral competences to be enlarged by extensive constitutional interpre-
tation.12
Thus, unlike the federal units of the Union of India, for example, 
the cantons still enjoy the right to establish their proper governmen-
tal system, to decide on the scope of autonomy of their municipalities, 
to determine the scope of direct democracy granted to the citizens, 
and to organize their own judiciary. In addition, cantons decide on 
their official languages (German, French, Italian and Romansh). The 
only limit of cantonal autonomy with regard to their freedom to de-
termine their governmental system is their obligation to grant the 
cantonal people the power to make the constitution and to comply 
with federal law. 
Unlike in Spain where Castilian is the official language through-
out Spain and the regions have the power to add a second official 
regional language to the official Spanish (Castilian) language, the 
Swiss cantons are totally sovereign to determine the official language 
or languages of the canton from among the four national languages. 
Switzerland has no one official language valid in the entire country 
as in Spain. Although German is spoken by almost two thirds of the 
Swiss population, parents moving from a German-speaking canton to 
a French-speaking canton, for example, will have to send their children 
into a French-speaking school because the cantons, and in multilingual 
cantons the municipalities, have the power to decide in which language 
education takes place. Even in private schools children have to learn 
the official language of the canton for a specified minimum number 
of years. 
Within their range of powers the cantons also had to find solu-
tions to the conflicts around diversity within the canton, in particular 
with regard to the different religious and language communities. 
Moreover, cantons have the power to organize themselves. For this 
reason there are important differences among the cantons with regard 
to the scope of autonomy of municipalities, including districts and 
agglomerations. Municipalities of cantons influenced by French po-
litical culture are granted less powers in comparison to German-speak-
ing cantons. 
12. Section 8 para 18 US Constitution.
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In some cantons all legislative decisions have to be submitted to 
the vote of the citizens, while the majority of the cantons provide only 
for the option of a referendum. Cantons also differ with regard to the 
relationship between church and canton. While the cantons of Geneva 
and Neuchâtel have separated state and religion according to the French 
model of the republican secular state, many other cantons have either 
followed the Zurich model of Protestant tradition or the model of the 
Catholic tradition related to the local municipal church communities.
Besides their power to organize themselves by their own con-
stitution, cantons have the power and responsibility to provide for 
security of the people, to guarantee mandatory primary education, 
to promote and protect their culture, to protect the environment and 
implement federal environmental standards, to build roads, and to 
provide – within the limits of the federal legislation – for cantonal 
development with regard to environment protection, housing, agri-
culture, and economy. The cantons are also the holders of public wa-
ter and water resources (including hydro-energy), of forests, game, 
and fishing.
The new constitution even enlarged cantonal powers in the field 
of foreign relations. Cantons are now expressly empowered to con-
clude treaties with other local authorities on all issues which are with-
in the scope of their autonomy.13
Municipal Diversity within the Cantons
Not only the new Federation, but also almost all cantons are 
enriched and challenged by their traditional internal religious and lin-
guistic diversity. Many of those cantons have also been built bottom-up 
from more or less autonomous municipalities or local farmers’ corpora-
tions. The peace treaties after the two civil wars between the Protestant 
and the Catholic cantons in the first half of the 16th century already 
established the principle of territoriality with regard to religion (which 
was not recognized until more than one century later in the peace of 
Westphalia for Europe). This principle of mutual tolerance respected 
13. Cf. European Convention for the International Cooperation of Local Authorities of 
Karlsruhe, 1982 and European outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-Operation between 
Territorial Communities or Authorities of Madrid, 1980.
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the cantonal territory and to a certain extent the territory of at least 
some municipalities, so that even now some religiously diverse cantons 
observe different Catholic and Protestant holidays according to the 
traditional religion of the majority of the population. Thus, federalism 
in Switzerland is not only based on cantonal autonomy, but also with-
in the cantons on the autonomy of the municipalities, which even 
today in multilingual cantons have different official languages and 
religious holidays according to their traditional territory and the lan-
guage or religion of the majority of the municipal population. 
With regard to their organization and powers, the situation of 
municipalities differs from one canton to the other. If one knows the 
specificity of municipalities one may even – without knowing the 
canton – recognize and identify their original canton. With regard to 
the size of their territory and population, one can observe important 
differences from one culture to the other. For example, the town of 
Zurich employs more civil servants than the smallest canton of Ap-
penzell i.Rh. has inhabitants! Although cantons always contested any 
power of the federation to intervene in the affairs of the munici-
palities, the new constitution provides in its Article 50 a federal guar-
antee of communal autonomy. This guarantee, however, depends on 
the autonomy conferred on the municipalities by the respective can-
tonal constitution. Thus, although the federal constitution has for the 
first time in history explicitly granted the municipalities a constitu-
tional guarantee, it has not interfered with the power of the cantons 
to determine the scope of autonomy granted to the municipalities. 
In addition, Article 50 of the constitution even requires the fed-
eral government to respect the interests of the communes and to give 
special attention to the bigger towns which have specific responsi-
bilities with regard to traffic, environmental protection, and expen-
ditures for security and social affairs.
1.5. Jura: The Creation of a new Canton 
Stability of Cantonal Territories
Unlike Indian federalism which was most dynamic with regard to 
the decrease and increase of the amount of federal units, which have 
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changed since the creation of the Republic of India 1949 as a result of 
a conflict management respecting ethnic and linguistic borders, the 
original federal compact of Switzerland in 1848 fixed the borders of 
the cantons once and for all. In fact, at the time of the creation of mo-
dern Switzerland in 1848, several cantonal borders were disputed and 
several regions wanted to secede from their canton and to merge into 
a neighboring canton or even create an additional canton. 
In order to establish sustainable peace after the civil war, the 
constitutions of 1848 and 1874 excluded any territorial changes to 
the cantons and required a guarantee from the federation of each 
canton’s constitutionally recognized territory. 
The Claim of the Jura Region for Self-Determination
Ever since the creation of Switzerland, the French-speaking pop-
ulation of the Jura region in the canton of Berne has always claimed 
the right of self-determination. However, this claim could only be 
implemented in the 1970’s. Thus in 1977, for the first time in modern 
Swiss history, a new canton of Jura with three mainly French-speaking, 
Catholic districts emerged as the result of a long lasting historic con-
flict with the canton of Berne. In fact, originally this region was offered 
to the canton of Berne by the European powers assembled within the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815 in order to compensate Berne, originally 
the biggest Swiss canton, for the loss of its territories in the east and 
the loss of the French-speaking canton of Vaud, which had been tak-
en away from Berne by Napoleon. Already at this time some politicians 
were aware that this gift to the canton of Berne was a mistake. Indeed, 
the Catholic districts, at least of this French-speaking region, never 
did fully integrate into the canton of Berne, and at the end of the 
19th century some political leaders were already calling to resolve 
the conflict with a secession of this region. 
How Can A New Canton Emerge Out Of An Old Canton?
The procedure for the creation of this new canton could be 
considered as a model for other similar territorial conflicts facing se-
cessionist movements. As a first step, the canton of Berne amended 
its constitution and granted the Jura region the democratic right of 
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self-determination based on a cascade of three steps of popular votes: 
the first step was a popular referendum on the issue of secession 
within the entire region. The decision of the majority of the region, 
however, was not definitively binding on those districts and munici-
palities in which the majority of the voters rejected secession. Those 
districts could then initiate a new referendum in order to remain, 
based on their right of self-determination, within the canton of Berne. 
In the end even the border municipalities were given the right of self-
determination granting the majority of the population the possibility 
to reject the majority vote of the district and to decide by demo-
cratic vote either to join the new canton or to remain within the 
canton of Berne. 
The Final Result of the Different Votes on Secession
The territory of the new canton shaped by these different votes 
did not divide the two new cantons in linguistic but religious terms. 
In fact, only the traditional religious area of the Catholic French-speak-
ing districts and municipalities decided to secede from the old canton 
in order to create the new canton of Jura. If countries threatened by 
secessionist movements had followed this principle of majorities break-
ing down to small municipalities many terrible recent conflicts, like 
those of the former Yugoslavia, Sudan, and Sri Lanka, may have been 
avoided. 
However, with the creation of a new 26th canton of Switzerland 
the conflict was not definitively solved. In particular, the opinions of 
the peoples within the districts of the old, mainly German-speaking 
canton/s have varied during the last 30 years. In addition, the new 
canton of Jura is always prepared to welcome the citizens of those 
districts within its territory. 
Seeking a Solution to Overcome the Division of the Jura
In order to find a sustainable, peaceful solution, a parliamen-
tary advisory assembly composed of representatives of the entire region 
was created. This assembly had the task of finding a peaceful solution 
that was acceptable to all in order to put an end to this conflict. In 
fact, the assembly was unable to agree on one solution. It proposed 
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two contradictory solutions: one to create a new common canton of 
the entire French-speaking region, and one to enlarge the already 
existing autonomy of the remaining French region within the canton 
of Bern. Thus Switzerland will in the near future still face some major 
challenges with regard to the borders of the canton of Berne. How-
ever, whatever solution is found, the number of the 26 federal cantons 
including 6 half-cantons will not change. 
Lessons to be learned from the Jura Case
The important lesson to be learned from this secessionist conflict 
is that within a multicultural country there are never straightforward 
solutions to ethnic conflicts. Most important, however, is that countries 
facing such conflicts can find legitimate, democratic procedures ac-
ceptable to the majority of the population concerned.
The New Constitutional Provision 53
The basically peaceful management of the Jura conflict by the 
canton of Berne has led the federal government to introduce an im-
portant provision in the new constitution to regulate similar conflicts 
within cantonal territories peacefully. For the first time the new Arti-
cle 53 of the federal constitution provides for a democratic procedure 
which enables peoples of different territories preferring to change 
the cantonal border lines and gives those regions a collective consti-
tutional right of self-determination. If the majority of the population 
and of the cantons concerned agrees, and if the sovereign power in 
Switzerland agrees, the proposal of the peoples of this region will be 
implemented. 
2. Diversities building up Switzerland
If one were to characterize Swiss Federalism in comparison to US 
or German Federalism, one would have to consider Swiss Federalism as 
a legitimate federal system which accommodates traditional diversities 
and holds those diversities together by direct democracy, autonomy of 
the municipalities and cantons, and by the participation of those diver-
sities within the decision-making process on the federal and cantonal 
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level. As these factors are manifold,we will first give a short overview 
of those diversities enriching and challenging Swiss Federalism.14
2.1. Religion
The First Compromise on Religion
The most ancient diversity, which forced the early Confederal 
Alliance in the middle ages to find a fundamental compromise, was 
the diversity between urban and rural cantons. The diversity which 
later caused the most violent conflicts in the 16th century was the 
religious diversity between the two Christian confessions, the Catho-
lics (today 42%) and the Protestants (today 33%). The compromises 
concluded in freedom treaties after a civil war in the early 16th cen-
tury still have repercussions on modern federalism. The decision of 
1529 (later partially revoked by the second peace of Kappelen “Kap-
peler Landfrieden”) gave cantons and even municipalities the power 
to decide on their official religion. This early principle of religious 
territoriality has been applied in many small territories with the effect 
that some cantons still have clear Protestant or Catholic majorities and 
some cantons are even religiously divided between rather Catholic or 
rather Protestant municipalities. This religious diversity has influenced 
a concept of intense relationship between the state and the religious 
communities and it directly or indirectly led, mainly in Protestant can-
tons, to the various democratic developments. Even today, cantons 
still distinguish with regard to the different democratic rights of the 
citizens. Moreover, religious diversity added a new diversity based on 
different concepts of the state and different tools of democratic par-
ticipation by citizens. 
Neutrality
The bitter conflicts among the different confessions even led to 
the first concepts of Swiss foreign policy: In 1647 the Swiss, in order 
14. See: Fleiner, and Hertig, Global Dialogue on Federalism vol. 7 on diversity, chapter on 
Switzerland (forthcoming).
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to avoid further involvement into the religious Thirty Years’ War in 
neighboring Germany, decided to abstain from these conflicts and to 
opt for a largely neutral position with regard to these conflicts. Thus, 
even Swiss neutrality, with its roots going back to the formal decision 
of the Vienna Congress in 1815, is not a consequence of foreign pol-
icy interests of Switzerland but the only foreign policy possible for a 
country challenged by internal diversities which are linked to conflict-
ing neighboring countries. 
Modern Religious Communities
Currently there are two major traditional religions (42% Roman 
Catholics and 33% Protestants) in Switzerland, not to mention the 
tiny minority of Jewish and older Christian religions. Amounting to a 
fifth of the population, foreign nationals further enhance the country’s 
diversity: 4% are Muslims, 2% are Orthodox, and 0.3% are Buddhists. 
While the traditional religions have been concentrated in more or less 
homogeneous territories, at least on the municipal level, the people 
belonging to recently-arrived religious communities are scattered 
throughout Switzerland but mainly live in larger agglomerations. 
Cantonal Autonomy15
With regard to the traditional religions of Switzerland, cantons 
enjoy extensive autonomy. The relationship between the religious 
communities and the state is defined within the cantonal constitution. 
Some cantons recognize and also privilege traditional communities 
such as Protestants, Catholics, the Old Christian Church, and a few 
cantons also the Jewish religious community. The federal constitution 
guarantees freedom of religion16. 
Switzerland has no establishment clause similar to the first 
amendment of the American Constitution. Thus, the federal constitu-
tion allows cantons to privilege traditional religious communities to 
15. Fleiner, Distribution of Powers and Responsibilities in Federal Countries, Switzerland, 
A Global Dialogue on Federalism vol 2 (Montreal, 2006).
16. Art. 15.
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a certain extent. However, the federal constitution explicitly compels 
the federal and cantonal authorities to ensure peace among religious 
communities.17
The Constitution of 1874 imposed an obligation on the cantons 
to run public but secular schools. Thus, public schools could not be 
run by church communities as in many other European countries. For 
more than 100 years, the majority of children have followed public 
curricula run by the municipalities. This obligation has been abolished 
with the new constitution, but modification does not in fact enlarge 
the cantonal powers as the cantons are in any case obliged to respect 
the fundamental right of religious freedom within their public 
schools.
2.2. Language
The Historical Emergence of Multilingual Switzerland
Following occupation by the French army after the French revo-
lution and during the reign of Napoleon, the small territory of Swit-
zerland, with a surface area of only 41,290 km2 and a population of 
7.3 million inhabitants (less than several metropolitan areas of today’s 
globalized world), developed into a multilingual federation with four 
different national languages: 64% German, 20% French, 6.5% Italian, 
and 0.5% Romansh18. The remaining 9% are languages of foreign 
migrants such as Serbo-Croat (1.4%), Albanian (1.3%), Portuguese 
(1.2%), Spanish (1.1%), English (1%), and Turkish 0.6%, as well as 
many minority languages.
Language Rights are also Collective Rights
Switzerland only exists on the basis of its diversity, namely, the 
respect of the four traditional national languages. Three of these 
17. Art. 72 para.2.
18. See the official statistical information at: http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/
infothek/lexikon/bienvenue___login/blank/zugang_lexikon.topic.1.html.
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national languages are at the same time the official languages of the 
neighboring countries around Switzerland: Germany and Austria for 
German, France for French, and Italy for Italian. For more than 200 
years Switzerland has been identified as a multilingual country. The 
liberty of language enshrined in the constitution is thus not only lim-
ited to an individual right, it is also considered a collective right, pro-
tecting language communities against infiltration by other languages 
within their territory. 
Cross-cutting Cleavages
With regard to the current challenges, one can certainly con-
sider that the conflict between religious communities dividing Swit-
zerland in earlier times is largely fading away. On the other hand, 
language has become the real challenging and dividing factor within 
Swiss society. However, one can also interestingly observe that com-
pared with many other countries divided by current ethnic conflicts, 
the cantonal border lines (except for the Jura) have neither been 
determined by language nor by religion. The Swiss cantons were gen-
erally not homogeneous in either religion or language. Cross-cutting 
cleavages of cantonal diversity are probably the most important social 
factor impeding the political division of the country.
So far, the Swiss Constitutional Federal Order has been success-
ful in achieving a subtle balance between unity and diversity. Due to 
the linguistic and cultural affinities of the French-, German-, and Ital-
ian-speaking parts with one of Switzerland’s neighboring countries, 
the politics of neutrality has throughout history prevented the old 
confederal alliance and the modern federation from alienating reli-
gious and linguistic communities and prevented European conflicts 
from upsetting the subtle balance of Swiss diversities. 
3. The Development of Principles in a Federal Country 
facing Diversity
Modern constitutionalism is based on the concept that human 
beings are universally equal. Factors such as cultural peculiarities are 
either denied (e.g. Civic States – France) or ignored as politically ir-
relevant (US melting pot). At most, culture may be considered as a 
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nation-building factor for culturally homogeneous nations (Germany). 
Switzerland, with several religions and languages, could not take over 
one of these national concepts.19 As a multicultural state, it can neither 
ignore culture as a political factor for national legitimacy nor can it 
deny the reality of its diversity. Cultural communities in Switzerland 
claim to be recognized not only as private but also as political com-
munities. The different cultures have to be valued as an essential 
political element of the federation. All different language communi-
ties need to consider the federation as their own homeland. In the 
following pages we will examine how the modern Swiss Federation 
with its constitution builds on and meets those challenges. 
3.1. Legitimacy
A Composite Nation
The political system of Switzerland20, which builds upon the cul-
tural diversity of its different communities, requires a new foundation 
for legitimacy – namely, a legitimacy based upon the concept of a com-
posite nation. Up to now, the classical concept of the nation united by 
the social contract has been based upon a “them and us” mentality. 
The us is united on the basis of commonly-recognized political and 
cultural values (what is good for us) or on the basis of universal values 
that the people within a particular territory together can hold. 
A composite nation needs a social contract that can unite diverse 
cultural communities through commonly recognized values. At the 
same time, this social contract must recognize the cultural values and 
independence of each of the particular communities. The common 
values establish what is recognized as good for a given cultural com-
munity (good for us) and also good for the various communities living 
within the state (good for the others), but not necessarily good for 
all human beings in the sense of universality.
19. Fleiner and Basta Fleiner, Constitutional Democracy in a multicultural and globalized 
World, (Springer, 2009); in particular chapter 8 p. 511 et seq.
20. Fleiner and Basta Fleiner, Federalism and Multiethnic States: the Case of Switzerland, 
Publication of the Institute of Federalism, (Fribourg, PIFF 16a 2000).
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Article 1 of the former Swiss Constitutions21 defined the Swiss 
nation explicitly as mentioned in the preamble that follows: 
“Together, the peoples of the 23 sovereign cantons of Switzer-
land united by the present alliance, to wit: Zurich, Berne, Lucer-
ne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden (Upper and Lower), Glarus, Zug, 
Fribourg, Soleure, Basle (City and Rural), Schaffhausen, Appenzell 
(both Rhodes), St. Gall, Grisons, Aargau, Thurgau, Ticino, Vaud, 
Valais, Neuchatel, Geneva and Jura, form the Swiss Confedera-
tion.” The “nation” is thus composed of the peoples of the di-
fferent cantons. The two most prominent neighbors of Switzer-
land — France and Germany, have totally contradictory answers 
to the question of to whom the state belongs. According to the 
German preamble, the state belongs to the German people: “the 
German People have adopted, by virtue of their constituent 
power, this Constitution” 
It is well known that the German Constitution based on the 
homogeneity of its people has become a model for many countries, 
following the idea that the pre-constitutional peoples have an inher-
ent right to self-determination. This concept is basically opposed to 
the civic concept of the French nation which is based on the territory 
and the concept of the a-cultural, purely political citizen. If Switzerland 
had followed either of its two most important neighbors, it would 
have become the country ruled by the majority of the German-speak-
ing Swiss tolerating the different smaller minorities (German model) 
or it would have followed the civic concept (French model) and then 
would have had to deny the multilingual and multi-religious reality 
of Swiss society. Moreover, if Switzerland had followed the Spanish 
concept based in Article 2 on the Spanish nation recognizing the dif-
ferent nationalities, it would have had to discriminate against the 
three minority languages as languages belonging to nationalities and 
thus not on an equal footing with the German language. 
The Swiss Constitution‘s answer to  this challenge is to legitimize 
the federation based on the peoples of the cantons which themselves 
are often held together by different language and religious commu-
nities. The Swiss Confederation is thus a nation composed of different 
21. Constitutions of 1848 and of 1874.
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peoples. It thus follows the new ideas of the Council of Europe, which 
rejects both the ethnic and the purely civic concept of the nation and 
encourages states to find a compromise between the civic and the 
ethnic concept of the nation-state.22 
There has however been an important development with the 
new constitution. The constitution of 2000 proclaims in its preamble 
that the Swiss people and the cantons are the basis of the confedera-
tion. This new faith in the Swiss people clearly shows that there has 
been an important step toward stronger integration of the multicul-
tural peoples of Switzerland. Such unity of the Swiss people, even in 
connection with the cantons, would most probably not have been 
possible during the entire 19th century. During this period Swiss soci-
ety was too strongly divided to accept being part of one common 
people. 
Taking Diversity Seriously
The current multicultural reality of societies requires states to 
take different communities based on language, religion, and culture 
seriously in political terms. Of course any state would proclaim itself 
to take diversity seriously. But if different communities are only toler-
ated as in the ethnic nation concept, or if they are marginalized into 
privacy as in the American melting pot system, they are in fact not 
taken seriously as political entities. If communities are taken serious-
ly, they need to participate politically in order to identify with their 
state, to legitimize its constitutional system, and also to be recognized 
as political entities forming part of the state structure as a whole. 
The new Swiss constitution proclaims even in its preamble: 
“We, the Swiss People and cantons[,…]. are determined to live 
our diversity in unity respecting one another”. 
Without diversity Switzerland would and could not exist. The 
identity of Switzerland is determined neither by a homogeneous peo-
ple nor by a civic nation composed of individual political citizens, but 
22. Cp. Doc. 10762.
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rather a society composed of different identities which only identifies 
with the reality of its diversity. Thus, Switzerland is, along with the 
“rainbow” country South Africa and some others23, one of the very 
few countries which identify themselves through diversity and not 
through unity.
Many countries promote and enhance the cultural heritage of 
the majority culture. The common language is considered an essential 
element to guarantee homogeneity and democratic communication 
as proclaimed in the famous Maastricht decision of the German Con-
stitutional Court.24 In those states, minority-language speakers are 
tolerated at best as guests who are allowed to use the mother tongue 
as a second language for private needs; in worst cases they are fear-
ed as potential enemies who might in some future outnumber the 
existing democratic majority and overthrow the ruling majority. 
A Fatherland or Motherland of Minorities
If a state wants to take the diversity of languages and cultures 
seriously, it cannot treat minorities only as tolerated guests; rather, it 
must give each of the various language and cultural communities a 
constitutionally recognized status and acknowledge the cultural com-
munities as being an essential part of the state. Cultural communities 
will only be able to recognize the state in which they live as being 
their homeland if they are able to contribute to the constitutional 
system of the state and to identify with it as their home state.
There is no person in Switzerland who does not belong to at 
least one minority. German-speaking citizens in the canton of Fribourg, 
which has mostly French-speaking citizens, belong to the German-
speaking minority in the canton and to the German-speaking major-
ity in Switzerland. Even a German-speaking Protestant in the canton 
of Zurich belongs to the Protestant minority in Switzerland but to the 
Protestant majority in Zurich. These overlapping cleavages often de-
scend from the top down until they reach the hierarchically lowest 
municipal level. 
23. E.g. multiethnic Nepal or multicultural Russia.
24. BVerfGE 89, 155.
The Current Situation of Federalism in Switzerland
77
REAF, núm. 9, octubre 2009, p. 51-90
The present constitutional system of citizenship accommodates 
such diverse feelings of identity. In fact, even with the new constitu-
tion, Switzerland has remained the only country in the world which 
provides for three levels of citizenship. According to Article 37 of the 
current constitution, each Swiss citizen must at the same time be a 
citizen of the canton as well as of the municipality. 
In the above-mentioned decision-making process for the new 
canton of Jura, small communities such as municipalities with less than 
100 inhabitants were granted the right to decide on their proper state 
“status”. As a consequence, they could decide to which canton they 
wanted to belong. In one case, municipalities in the district of Laufen-
tal even had the possibility either to remain within the new canton 
of Jura, to stay with its original canton of Berne, or to merge with 
another neighboring canton. After several votes25 the people of the 
district of Laufen decided in 1994 to merge with the neighboring 
canton of Basel (Landschaft) and to consider this canton their father-
land.
The European Union introduced its new currency, the euro, the 
legal tender of each member state belonging to the euro zone. All 
countries belonging to the euro zone have labeled this common cur-
rency with the same wording: euro. Unlike this common label of the 
euro, one can read the word Swiss franc in German, French, Italian 
and Romansh on each banknote in Switzerland. Because there would 
not be enough space for four languages on the five-franc pieces, one 
can actually read the name of the Confederation in Latin, which was 
the lingua franca in the middle ages. These may be small symbols but 
such symbols are important to enable even the smallest minority to 
identify with its country and to consider its country as its father- or 
motherland.
Citizenship: Multiple Loyalty 
Most states demand absolute loyalty of their citizens to the ba-
sic values of the nation and therefore prohibit dual or multiple citi-
zenship. On the other hand,, states which recognize the political 
25. One was even annulled by the Federal Supreme Court: BGE 114 Ia 427.
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value of their different cultural communities have to accept, at least 
internally, that citizens will have double loyalty: loyalty to their cul-
tural community on one hand, and loyalty to the political state on the 
other. At the same time, citizens must be able to exhibit loyalty in 
relation to their cultural community based in another state. The rec-
ognition of such double or multiple loyalties must find its expression 
in a concept of citizenship which accepts dual or multiple citizenship. 
The common citizenship of the European Union may mark the first 
step towards such recognition of multiple citizenship within it.
Except for the small minority of the Romansh-speaking people, 
each of the traditional cultures of Switzerland are more or less cultur-
ally related to our neighbor states: Germany, Austria, France, and 
Italy. Promotion and support of these cultures calls for intense cul-
tural cooperation with the respective neighbor countries. Although 
the Swiss may identify with the political order of Switzerland, they 
often feel close to the culture of their respective neighbor state. 
Citizens’ feelings of loyalty towards their neighbor states is in 
many conflictive areas of the world considered as one of the most 
dangerous causes of international or civil wars. In many of those ar-
eas, citizenship regulations are one of the causes of such conflicts. 
Countries which offer or even recognize citizens of a neighboring 
country as belonging to their culture or as kin-state citizens will create 
important international tensions. The same is the case when countries 
grant special privileges to their cultural community living in a neigh-
bor state. 
In Switzerland, multiple loyalties have some tradition; in fact, the 
new law on citizenship no longer prohibits multiple citizenships, unlike 
the previous statute. Switzerland participates in the summit of states 
representing the francophone peoples. The Federal Government of 
Switzerland also participates in summits of the German-speaking coun-
tries. On the other hand, even the parliamentary assembly of the can-
ton of Jura participates in the Parliamentary Francophone Assembly. 
Most states are built on the basis of the exclusive loyalty of their 
citizens, who may even be asked to sacrifice their lives for the military 
defense of their country. Dual citizenship is therefore often prohib-
ited. A state which recognizes the political value of its different cul-
tural communities will have to be based on a concept of multiple 
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loyalties, a concept that will have to rely on double or even multiple 
citizenships, like for instance citizenship of the European Union.
3.2. The Rule of Law
The Right to be Different
The prevailing concept of equal rights is based on the assump-
tion that all human beings are equal and should be treated equally, 
and that all individuals should have equal opportunities within the 
political community. However, in multicultural states people want to 
have equal opportunities within their cultural community. They also 
want their community to be treated equally in comparison to other 
bigger or smaller cultural communities, for example in terms of equal 
language rights. In terms of their cultural peculiarities, people want 
to be recognized and respected as different. Members of minority 
cultures claim equal rights as citizens without any discrimination or 
stigmatization. The value of their culture has to represent the same 
quality irrespective of the inferiority in the number of their kinsmen. 
Cultural diversity needs to be considered a value and not a burden.
The Swiss Constitution guarantees in its Article 4 that all na-
tional languages have equal recognition, although the number of 
kinsmen speaking these languages differs enormously. One also has 
to admit, of course, that in Article 70 of the constitution the Roman-
sh language spoken by only 0.5 % of people does not have the same 
value as an official language compared to German, French and Italian. 
Paragraph 5 of this provision is important with regard to the develop-
ment of federalism however, as it compels the federal government to 
foster all measures of the respective cantons to promote and defend 
Romansh (canton of Grison), and Italian (cantons of Ticino and Grison), 
the two languages which look doomed to die out.
Collective Rights
Individuals belonging to different cultural communities want 
not only to be treated equally as individuals; they also expect their 
cultural community and themselves as members of that community 
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to be treated as equal to members of other communities. If a minor-
ity culture is not recognized as having equal cultural value to the 
majority culture, the members of the minority culture will feel dis-
criminated. Harmony between the different cultural communities is 
primarily based on the equal cultural and political recognition of the 
collective value of the different communities. The collective value of 
culture has to be equally recognized for all cultural communities re-
gardless of numbers or statistics. The multicultural state needs to strike 
a fair balance between the freedom of the individual and the claim 
of the community for its autonomy and respect.
The smallest collectivities having specific collective rights in Swit-
zerland are the municipalities with a constitutional right to autonomy. 
As mentioned above, municipalities have been the territorially guaran-
teed homeland for different religious (including Jewish) and language 
minorities. Article 16 of the new language legislation of the canton of 
Grison, with three official languages (German, Italian and Romansh), 
since 2008, stipulates that if 40% of inhabitants of a municipality speak 
one language, this language will be the only official language of the 
municipality. If 20% speak the same language, the municipality will be 
bilingual.26 These provisions are clearly focused on the protection of 
the smallest endangered languages, Romansh and Italian. 
In 1990 the Federal Supreme Court upheld an order for the 
owner of a restaurant in the small municipality of Disentis, which had 
Romansh as its official language, to remove a sign on his building 
written in Italian, as the official language of the municipality was 
Romansh.27 This principle of territorial protection of language, which 
is of course also a collective right of language communities, is now 
even enshrined in Article 70 of the new constitution. 
Liberty and Peace
The aim of the liberal state is to protect, maintain, and promote 
individual liberty. A state composed of different cultural communities 
26. 492.100 Sprachengesetz des Kantons Graubünden, Legge sulle lingue del Cantone dei 
Grigoni, Lescha da lingua dal chantun Grischun (2006) Art. 16.
27.  BGE 116 Ia 345.
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should additionally aim to maintain peace among the different com-
munities. The constitution will have to perform a difficult balancing 
act between individual liberty on one side and peace among the dif-
ferent communities on the other side (e.g. individual liberty of lan-
guage versus territorial protection of minority language). 
For the sake of peace, it might be necessary, for example, to 
restrict individual language rights in order to uphold the collective 
rights of a minority that fears for the survival of its culture. Peace will 
also be fostered by the recognition of collective rights to cultural 
autonomy and limited territorial autonomy for different communities, 
such as that which is accorded to the cantons and municipalities in 
Switzerland. In order to improve the responsibility of the confedera-
tion to pursue peace among the different cultural communities, Arti-
cle 70 of the constitution transfers the obligation to seek good un-
derstanding between the different language communities28 to the 
Confederation and the cantons. In article 72 the Confederation and 
the cantons are clearly obliged to “take measures to maintain public 
peace between the members of the various religious communities.”
3.3. Shared Rule
Participation o,f minority cultural communities  
in constitution making
Constitution making in multicultural states can only succeed in 
justifying, establishing, or limiting the power of the state if the con-
stitutional principles are perceived by all cultural communities as be-
ing legitimate. This legitimacy can only be achieved if the various 
cultural communities are given the right to participate on an equal 
footing in the constitution making process, and are therefore able to 
identify with the state and its constitution. Such legitimacy can only 
be achieved if the different communities participate in the decision-
making process with a real chance to get their proposals to be ac-
cepted. The second chamber, which like the American Senate is com-
28. Art. 70 para. 2: 3 “The Confederation and the Cantons shall encourage understanding 
and exchange between the linguistic communities.”
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posed of two members per canton (half cantons have one member), 
has the same powers as the national chamber. Having the same pow-
ers as the national chamber the second, cantonal chamber has to 
ratify any constitutional amendment. Without its consent no amend-
ment can be submitted to the vote of the people and the cantons. 
Moreover, any constitutional reform necessarily needs the ap-
proval of the majority of the national voters, and the majority of the 
cantonal voters also have to approve the amendment. With regard to 
the state status of local communities, Article 53 of the constitution 
stipulates expressly that for any modification of border lines which may 
also modify the state status of local municipalities, the concerned com-
munity has to approve this, as well as the cantonal community which 
might also be affected if part of its cantonal territory changed. 
Power Sharing between Cultural Communities
In multicultural states a system of government based on the pure 
majoritarian principle according to the “winner-takes-all” concept will 
not be able to achieve lasting legitimacy in the eyes of minority com-
munities. Under such a system, minorities will feel permanently mar-
ginalized. The pure majority principle, according to which a demo-
cratic winner with 51 percent of the votes can acquire 100 percent of 
the state power, has to be modified in order for the principle of de-
mocracy to be acceptable to minority cultural groups. Such moderation 
can be achieved by introducing elements of power sharing, thereby 
enabling minorities that would otherwise be permanently excluded 
from participation in the political decision-making process to have 
their say and to actively contribute to the common welfare of the 
state. 
With regard to general participation in the federal decision-
making process, the new federal constitution has shifted the federal 
balance of self-rule to give more weight to the shared rule principle. 
It has centralized different, originally cantonal powers, but at the 
same time it has strengthened the cantons’ possibilities of participat-
ing in the decision-making process at federal level. Thus, the new 
federal constitution does compel the federal government on principle 
to consult the cantonal governments in any important matter and in 
particular with regard to any proposed legislative decision (Art. 45). 
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As a principle, the constitution requires good cooperation between 
the federal government and the cantons. Any dispute should be solved 
peacefully by mediation29. With regard to foreign policy, Article 55 is 
inspired by the corresponding articles of the German and Austrian 
constitutions, taking into account the wish of the federal units to be 
informed and to present their interests in the participation of their 
government within the decision-making process of the European Un-
ion. Accordingly, the federal government has to include the cantons 
in all issues of foreign policy which might concern their powers and 
their interests; they have to be informed and the government is man-
dated to take their proposals into account.
For more than one and a half centuries cantonal governments, 
and even cantonal administrations have cooperated in more or less 
advisory or consultative conferences. Since 1993, forced by the Swiss 
integration policy, a permanent conference of the cantonal govern-
ments has also been set up to act as a general link between the can-
tonal and the federal executives. However, this new institution is still 
quite different from the Canadian rule by intergovernmental rela-
tions.
3.4. Self-Rule
Autonomy
Cultural and language communities must be able, through ter-
ritorial autonomy or group autonomy, to independently and autono-
mously regulate matters relating to their own cultural development 
and cultural heritage. Moreover, they must be empowered to imple-
ment, within their own cultural community, decisions made at the 
highest level on the basis of the principle of shared rule. This entails 
autonomy over matters such as education, court jurisdiction, admin-
istration and police. As already mentioned, the new constitution has, 
in principle, diminished the powers of the cantons and enlarged the 
central powers of the federal government. 
29. Art. 44 para. 3: “Disputes between Cantons or between Cantons and the Confederation 
shall wherever possible be resolved by negotiation or mediation.”
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However, in some instances, the autonomy of cantons has also 
been slightly strengthened. With the new financial reform of federal-
ism, the constitution has enshrined the principle of subsidiarity (Art. 
5a). In addition to this provision, the new Article 43a, also as a conse-
quence of the financial reform, clearly defines some mainly financial 
criteria for new decisions on the division of powers between the con-
federation and the cantons. The main idea is therefore to divide pow-
ers according to financial possibilities and — to an extent following 
the Spanish (Cst. Art. 130 para 1), and the German (Cst. Art. 72 para 
2) models — as to the right of inhabitants to have at least their basic 
needs assured by the authorities (Art. 43a). 
With regard to the financial possibilities of the cantons, the 
constitution compels the confederation to provide for enough finan-
cial means so that cantons can finance their traditional obligations. 
(Art. 47 para.2)
The federal constitution has also taken into account that many 
cantonal solutions are based on treaties regulating their multilateral 
or bilateral cooperation. The old constitution merely prohibited po-
litical treaties between the cantons and reserved the right to conclude 
other treaties. The new constitution — at least with regard to its 
wording — empowers the cantons to conclude treaties among them-
selves. Since 2004 they are also empowered to set up common institu-
tions with legislative powers and they can ask the confederation to 
declare multilateral treaties, which do not have the consent of all 
cantons, which generally bind even  the cantons which have rejected 
them. 
Fostering Diversity
A multicultural state can only establish sustainable legitimacy 
if it does not just tolerate diversity, but actually promotes and fosters 
diversity and accords it a value that can bring all cultural communities 
together into a common polity. This aim will only be fulfilled if each 
cultural community is convinced that its own internal values will be 
better realized within the existing common state than in its own state 
established through secession and self-determination. The develop-
ment of polyphonic music has long been regarded as a sign of high 
culture and civilization. In the field of politics and democracy, how-
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ever, many states and peoples still prefer monotony to polyphony. 
Federal states on the other hand are examples for the development 
of more complex forms of political order. Analogous to polyphony in 
music, they can be considered as an expression of the complexity of 
human reality. Federal states do not suffocate diversity with mo-
notony but promote diversity as a value of a “polyphonic” federal 
state. 
Article 2 para. 2 of the constitution requires the federal govern-
ment to foster the diversity of the country.  It gives the federal gov-
ernment a new role with regard to the internal diversity of the coun-
try, including the diversity caused by migration, but it also obliges the 
federal government to undertake all measures not only to uphold the 
existing diversity, but even to promote diversity in order to enable 
each community to develop its proper identity.
3.5. Democracy
Self-determination of Individuals as a Democratic Aim
Democracy should not be reduced to a state principle, the sole 
purpose of which is to produce an efficient majority. Rather, democ-
racy should be seen as serving liberty and as establishing through 
public discourse the legitimacy of procedures and institutions for po-
litical consensus-building according to the famous Gettysburg address 
by president Lincoln: “with the people, by the people, and for the 
people”. A consensus-oriented democratic process, in which decisions 
are made from the bottom up, is based on the conviction that each 
decision of the policy should provide for the single individual as much 
self-determination as possible, whether this be through individual 
liberty or through optimal participation in the community. 
The smaller the community in which decisions are made, the less 
individual self-determination is limited. Within the small group, the 
single individual has the greatest chance of contributing to the design 
of the polity and to exercise freedom within the group. The federal 
division of democracy into two or three levels of democratic units, 
which can even be extended to the international level, provides for 
an optimal balance of self- and co-determination. It guarantees that 
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the broadest possible consensus will be sought for the decisions at 
each respective level in order to guarantee the greatest possible self-
determination. 
In Switzerland, challenged and enriched by diversity, minority 
communities would be condemned to a permanent lower status if 
democracy were only considered as a tool to produce efficient ma-
jorities. In fact, a “winner-takes-all” democracy has never been suc-
cessful in Switzerland. The Swiss consider that democracy does not 
only regulate decision-making procedures, but is even considered as 
a better guarantee of liberty than a constitutional court. Because the 
people can decide on legislation and on constitutional issues, they can 
determine to what extent they accept legislative or constitutional 
limitations of their liberty. 
According to the preamble of the constitution, the Swiss people 
and the cantons “know that only those who use their freedom remain 
free”.  A state which adheres to such values will not accept any de-
velopment which might install the tyranny of the majority. The main 
reason why the Swiss Confederation has remained strongly federal 
and decentralized despite the international and social development 
of the welfare state, which would have suggested much stronger 
centralization, is mainly due to direct democracy which will also in 
future prevent the central government making any centralist pro-
posal which has no sound, rational justification.
The Value of Compromise as an Alternative to “Winner-takes-
all” Democracy
Most democracies enable a winning party or governmental coa-
lition to assume 100 percent of the state power on the basis of support 
from 51 percent or less of the voters (e.g. the United Kingdom). In a 
multicultural state this system needs to be adapted in order to accom-
modate the reality of cultural diversity. Pure majoritarianism sup-
presses diversity. Diversity can only flourish in a culture oriented to-
wards consensus and compromise. The political decision-making 
process and political institutions have to be guided by the idea that 
a compromise which produces broad agreement has a higher value 
with regard to justice than a small majority. This of course presup-
poses a political culture that respects compromise as a quality and a 
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strength rather than a weakness, because compromise enables the 
achievement of a higher consensus and thus a more comprehensive 
majority. The small majority of 51 percent within a multicultural de-
mocracy must accept compromises in order to achieve the consensus 
of a much larger majority. Decision-making procedures and political 
institutions must be guided by the value of compromise as an instru-
ment for conflict management.
The development of Swiss federalism is clear evidence for this 
basic principle. The beginning of the early confederation of the 15th 
century was already based on a compromise between town and rural 
areas. The religious conflicts in the 16th century ended with a compro-
mise which again enabled peaceful cooperation. The first constitution 
of 1848 was a basic compromise between the conservative Catholic 
and the liberal Protestant cantons. Finally, the new constitution is also 
a compromise which takes into account the basic conviction of the 
preamble of the constitution: “that the strength of a people is meas-
ured by the welfare of the weakest of its members.”
Conflict management30
Democratic procedures should not only serve to produce efficient 
and legitimate decisions. They must also be conceived as tools for man-
aging conflict between different communities. This requires that the 
procedures are designed in such a way as to facilitate the resolution of 
disputes through rational discourse. This means that categorical conflicts 
need to be minimized through appropriate state structures and proce-
dures, so that conflicting groups will feel sufficiently secure that they 
will opt to engage in discourse rather than resorting to violence.
The new Article 44 of the constitution on the principles of co-
operation between the cantons and the confederation thus stipulates 
as follows:
1 The confederation and the cantons shall collaborate, and shall 
support each other in the fulfillment of their tasks.
30. Wolf Linder, Swiss Democracy, Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies, 
(New York 1994).
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2 They owe each other mutual consideration and support. They 
shall grant each other administrative and judicial assistance.
3 Disputes between cantons, or between cantons and the con-
federation shall, to the extent possible, be resolved through 
negotiation or mediation.
3.6. Future Challenges to Swiss Federalism
In a period of globalization and of the fading away of the tra-
ditional nation-state, Swiss federalism is of course confronted with 
many major challenges. The main and most immediate challenge is 
presented by the relationship of Switzerland with the European Union. 
The majority in Switzerland is still of the opinion that a full integra-
tion into this supra-national organization would endanger federalism, 
direct democracy and the traditional identity of Switzerland. Many 
powers of the European Union are currently at least partially within 
the constitutional competences of the cantons, and this is the federal 
challenge. Often, directives of the European Union which have to be 
implemented by the member states would be subject to a popular 
referendum on a federal or cantonal basis; in addition, decisions of 
the European Union are often made by the member states’ executives 
and prepared by member states’ administrations. The challenge of 
the referendum to the strong tendency towards executive decisions 
is the democratic challenge. For centuries Switzerland was almost the 
only democracy facing neighboring countries with a monarchical tra-
dition. To realize that all of a sudden Europe is just as democratic as 
Switzerland is the identity challenge. 
Analyzing the long history of Swiss federalism, I am convinced, 
however, that the federal and democratic institutions will provide for 
a most open, dynamic future for today’s Swiss society which can also 
enable Switzerland to adapt its institutions without losing its identity, 
the federal system and the principle of direct democracy. Just as small 
member states such as Ireland and Denmark did not give up their iden-
tity, a small federal state like Switzerland should be able to adapt its 
institutions without losing its political strength and participate within 
the European community, which has developed as a multicultural Eu-
ropean alliance in a very similar way to the Swiss Confederation. 
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ABSTRACT
Swiss Federalism builds on the traditional and to a certain extent also the 
modern diversities. Since middle age the Swiss confederation has always been 
enriched and challenged by economic, religious, cultural and linguistic diver-
sities. Since the foundation of Switzerland as a state of modernity in 1848 
the constitution has been more than 100 times modified with specific provi-
sions. In addition there have been two total revisions in 1874 and in 1999. 
With the new consti tution the federal balance between shared rule and self 
rule has slightly been changed. It has centralized some of the powers and 
com pensated the loss of self rule with more shared rule and thus given can-
tons more possibilities to participate within the federal decision making pro-
cess. With regard to the diversities the new federal constitution has introdu-
ced important provisions in order to strengthen the federal legitimacy and 
to provide democratic tools for conflict management.
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rule; collective rights; direct democracy; compromise; bottom up federalism; 
municipalities; constitutional review; judiciary.
RESuM
El federalisme suís es basa en diversitats tradicionals i, en certa manera, 
també en diversitats modernes. Des de l’edat mitjana, la Confederació Suïs-
sa s’ha anat enriquint mentre feia front a reptes de diversitats econòmiques, 
religioses, culturals i lingüístiques. Des que Suïssa es va fundar com a estat 
modern, el 1848, la Constitució del país ha estat esmenada més de 100 ve-
gades amb disposicions específiques. A banda d’això, ha estat revisada com-
pletament dues vegades, el 1874 i el 1999. Amb la nova Constitució, l’equilibri 
federal entre el govern compartit i l’autogovern ha canviat lleugerament. 
S’han centralitzat alguns poders, i la pèrdua d’autogovern s’ha vist compen-
sada amb més govern compartit, la qual cosa dóna als cantons l’oportunitat 
d’augmentar la participació en els processos de presa de decisions d’àmbit 
federal. Pel que fa a les diversitats, la nova Constitució federal ha introduït 
dis po sicions importants dirigides a consolidar la legitimitat federal i facilitar 
eines democràtiques per a la gestió de conflictes.
Paraules clau: Confederació; legitimitat; sobirania cantonal; autogovern; 
govern compartit; drets col·lectius; democràcia directa; compromís; federal-
isme ascendent; municipis; revisió constitucional; poder judicial.
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RESuMEn
El federalismo suizo se basa en diversidades tradicionales y hasta cierto grado, 
también modernas. Desde la Edad Media, la Confederación Suiza se ha ido 
enriqueciendo afrontando retos de diversidades económicas, religiosas, cul-
turales y lingüísticas. Desde que Suiza se fundó como Estado moderno en 
1848, su Constitución se ha enmendado más de 100 veces con disposiciones 
específicas. Además, ha sido revisada por completo dos veces, en 1874 y en 
1999, respectivamente. Con la nueva Constitución ha cambiado ligeramente 
el equilibrio federal entre el gobierno compartido y el autogobierno. Algu-
nos de los poderes se han centralizado, y la pérdida de autogobierno ha sido 
compensada con más gobierno compartido, lo que da a los cantones la opor-
tunidad de una mayor participación en los procesos de toma de decisión a 
nivel federal. Con respecto a las diversidades, la nueva Constitución federal 
ha introducido importantes disposiciones con el fin de fortalecer la legiti-
midad federal y proporcionar instrumentos democráticos para la gestión de 
conflictos.
Palabras clave: Confederación; legitimidad; soberanía cantonal; autogobi-
erno; gobierno compartido; derechos colectivos; democracia directa; com-
promiso; federalismo ascendente; municipios; revisión constitucional; poder 
judicial.
